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Risk communicationLike other countries, the United Kingdom faces the unavoidable challenge of adapting to a
changing climate. However, public perceptions of the risk posed by climate change and
support for adaptation policies vary between countries. This article provides a UK-speciﬁc
review of climate change beliefs, risk perceptions regarding potential climate change
impacts, and attitudes towards climate change adaptation. We report on differences
between expert and public conceptualisations of climate change risks. We also examine
the effects of psychological distancing, climate change awareness, and hazard experience
on both concerns about climate change and perceptions of the weather-related risks posed
by climate change. Additionally, we review the effects of emotion, agency, perceived
responsibility, place attachment, personal values and uncertainty on the willingness of
UK residents to support and engage with climate change adaptation. We outline the impli-
cations of these factors for climate risk communication and highlight key areas for future
research.
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Introduction
Across the world, decision-makers face the challenge of adapting to a changing climate (Moss et al., 2013). However, pub-
lic perceptions of the risk posed by climate change and support for adaptation policies vary between countries. Our review
focuses on public perceptions of climate change risk and adaptation in the United Kingdom because of the advanced and
pioneering nature of climate adaptation research and policy in this country (Mullan et al., 2013). The UK was the ﬁrst country
in the world to adopt climate change legislation that covered both adaptation and mitigation (Climate Change Act 2008). This
legislation has required the UK government to assess the risks associated with climate change, and to prepare a national pro-
gramme for climate change adaptation. The ﬁrst Climate Change Risk Assessment (CCRA) was published in January 2012
(Defra, 2012), followed by a National Adaptation Programme announced in July 2013.
Climate change adaptation policies will vary by country because of different national contexts and different exposure to
climate hazards. These may include changes in the frequency and severity of extreme weather events, sea level rise, changes
to the biosphere, and the emergence of hazards that have not before been experienced locally (e.g. forest ﬁres in areas where
these have not previously posed a threat, diseases that have previously only thrived in warmer climates becoming more pre-
valent). Additionally, second order impacts such as supply chain disruption resulting from changes in climate occurring in
other parts of the world may pose additional, more complex country-speciﬁc risks.
As risk perception has itself been found to be speciﬁc to culture and place (Weber and Hsee, 1999), it is also to be
expected that public perceptions of the threat posed by climate change, and support for adaptation policies, will vary across
countries. Indeed, research making cross-country comparisons has demonstrated clear differences in public climate change
beliefs and conceptualisation. Despite the pioneering nature of climate policy in the UK, international comparisons of public
climate change beliefs indicate that UK residents are less worried about climate change (Lorenzoni and Pidgeon, 2006), and
less likely to believe that climate change is the result of human activity than those in some other European countries such as
Italy, Spain and France (Ipsos MORI, 2014). Differences in conceptualisations of climate change have also been found
between the UK and the US, with UK residents being more likely to reference ‘rain’ when asked to describe climate change,
and US residents more likely to mention ‘heat’ and ‘ice caps melting’. (Lorenzoni et al., 2006); In another UK study that asked
people to describe the impacts of climate change, ‘‘ﬂooding’’ was the most common response and ‘‘heat’’ was only the ninth
most common response (Whitmarsh, 2009). Indeed, recent research indicates that people in the UK perceive heavy rainfall
and ﬂooding to have increased over the course of their lifetime, and hot weather to have decreased over the course of their
lifetime, with the former being most strongly associated with their concerns about climate change (Taylor et al., 2014). Even
within the UK, public responses to climate change adaptation policies may vary according to perceptions of local climate
change risks. For example, residents of the Northern UK may favour the prospect of hotter summers and warmer winters
than those in the South East (Palutikof et al., 2004). This further illustrates the importance of understanding regional differ-
ences in perceptions of climate change and its potential impacts.
To improve public debate and communication about climate change adaptation, it is important to understand how public
perceptions of climate change risk differ from the risk conceptualisations of experts engaged in scientiﬁc thinking (Weber
and Stern, 2011). Classic public perception research shows that experts and lay people often disagree about how to deﬁne
risks (Fischhoff et al., 1978; Slovic, 1987; Slovic et al., 1979). Expert assessments of risk are grounded in technical projections
of expected death, injury and property damage. By contrast, public risk perceptions tend to consider hazards more risky
when they are relatively more unfamiliar, and evoke more negative emotions due to their catastrophic potential (Slovic,
1987). As a result, lay people perceive technologies like nuclear power as more risky than do experts.
More recent work in psychology has also pointed to the importance of emotions, in addition to cognition, in public per-
ceptions of risk and associated decision making (Epstein, 1994; Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman and Frederick, 2002;
Loewenstein et al., 2001; Slovic et al., 2005; Stanovich and West, 2000, 2008). Dual-process theories have identiﬁed two
modes of thought, the intuitive and the analytic (Epstein, 1994; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich and West, 2000, 2008). The intu-
itive mode of thought is characterised as being fast, undemanding, and driven by emotional responses and spontaneous asso-
ciations. It tends to be used in everyday thinking, and when expertise or time is limited. The analytic mode meanwhile is
characterised as being slow, effortful, and involving deliberate reasoning. It is presumed to be indicative of the formal
thought processes required for scientiﬁc thinking (Kahneman and Frederick, 2002; Stanovich and West, 2008). The degree
to which individuals rely on the two modes of thought may depend on the task at hand. Indeed, scientists may rely more
on affective/experiential processes when considering topics on which they are not experts.
This paper reviews the relevant public perception literature on climate change risk and adaptation for the UK, which
includes a broad range of ﬁelds including psychology, riskmanagement, human geography and social policy. Our review there-
fore takes a similarly interdisciplinary approach. The following section ‘Literature searchmethod’ details the literature search
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followed by eight sections exploring the key themes emerging from these papers. ‘Non-experts’ mental models of climate
change, climate impacts and climate’ focuses on lay people’smental models of climate change, including commonmisconcep-
tions and the role of psychological distance. ‘Climate changebeliefs and adaptation’ discusses the relationship between climate
changeawareness andwillingness to adapt. ‘Experience, riskperceptionandaction’ focuseson the relationshipbetweenhazard
experience, risk perception and willingness to engage in adaptation actions. ‘Emotions’ discusses the potential inﬂuence of
emotions on perceptions of climate change risk and adaptation. Section ‘Responsibility and agency’ focuses on the role of per-
ceived responsibility and ability in adapting to climate change impacts. ‘Place attachment’ covers the potential inﬂuences of
place attachment and identity on what is considered ‘acceptable’ adaptation. ‘Personal values and individual differences’ dis-
cusses the role of personal and political values. The challenge of communicating uncertainty about climate change impacts is
then considered in ‘Uncertainty’, with ‘Synthesis and future directions’ concluding by outlining directions for further research.
Literature search method
This review focuses on a core set of 44 peer reviewed papers directly relevant to public perceptions of climate change risk
and adaptation in the United Kingdom. Where appropriate however discussion of these papers is supplemented by ﬁndings
from the broader risk perception literature, which includes some studies from outside the UK. To identify this core set of arti-
cles a systematic literature search was conducted. Combinations of relevant keywords pertaining to climate change (e.g. cli-
mat⁄ risk, ﬂood⁄, weather extreme) and risk (e.g. risk perception⁄, risk communication) were initially used to search the Web
of Science database (now Web of Science Core Collection) in October 2012 (see Appendix A). Papers were retained for inclu-
sion in this core set if they: (1) directly pertained to public perceptions of climate change or adaptation to potential climate
change impacts; and (2) reported on studies conductedwithmembers of the UK public.Worldwide and pan-European studies
were also retained if members of the UK public were included in the sample. Studies that did not focus primarily on percep-
tions of climate change or adaptation, or that focussed on groups other than the UK public were not included in this core set of
articles. Review articles and perspectives were also excluded unless they contained reanalysis of existing data were also
excluded from the core set; although some of these are cited here in a supplementary capacity.
Our initial search yielded 27 relevant papers (see supplementary material for a complete list of all 331 papers generated
by this search1). Additionally, we found that these papers mentioned 17 further relevant references, which were subsequently
incorporated into our core set of 44 papers.
As seen in Table 1 below, 2 of the 44 papers identiﬁed included UK residents as part of a European sample, and 3 as part of
a worldwide sample. Of those papers that explicitly speciﬁed that the research was conducted with participants from a par-
ticular region of the UK, 15 focussed on England, 5 on England and Wales, 3 on Scotland, and 2 on England and Scotland.
Surveys were the most commonly utilised research design (29 papers), followed by interviews (13 papers), focus groups
(9 papers), experiments (4 papers) and Q sorting (3 papers). A case study and a participatory workshop were also reported.
Sample sizes ranged from n = 15 to n > 3000 depended on the methodology; with surveys using larger samples than inter-
view and focus group studies. The following sections are based on a systematic analysis of these papers.
Non-experts’ mental models of climate change, climate impacts and climate risks
To communicate effectively about climate change and climate change adaptation, it is important to understand people’s
current beliefs, as well as potential misunderstandings (Bruine de Bruin and Bostrom, 2013; Morgan et al., 2001). In this sec-
tion we discuss existing research about how the UK public conceptualise climate change, its potential impacts and the
threats posed by those impacts. We focus on two key ﬁndings: the conﬂation of climate change and the risk posed by its
impacts with other environmental risks, and psychological distance.
The conﬂation of climate change with other environmental risks
One ﬁnding that has been consistently observed in the UK and elsewhere is that climate change and its associated risks
are often conﬂated with other environmental problems (Bostrom and Lashof, 2007; Kempton, 1991; Read et al., 1994;
Reynolds et al., 2010). When asked to describe climate change, a large proportion of UK and US participants have made ref-
erence to ozone depletion (Lorenzoni et al., 2006; Whitmarsh, 2009). Indeed, cross-European research indicates that people
often fail to distinguish between environmental issues; emphasising general concerns pertaining to resource use, regardless
of the speciﬁc issue in question (Fischer et al., 2012). These observations are consistent with the notion (outlined in the
‘Introduction’) that non-experts’ everyday thinking draws upon spontaneous associations (Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman
and Frederick, 2002; Stanovich and West, 2008) It is also in keeping with research in the broader risk communication liter-
ature which suggests that people draw on analogies with familiar risks when trying to understand less familiar risks
(Palmgren et al., 2004; Visschers et al., 2007; Wallquist et al., 2010). Of course, the conﬂation of climate change with other
environmental problems does not necessarily preclude people from making appropriate behavioural changes or supporting1 This reference list represents an accurate reﬂection of search output for the period January 1900–October 2012 as of 01/09/2014.
Table 1
Papers identiﬁed in the literature search including geographic focus, methodology and sample size.
Authors Title Geographic focus Method Sample size
Abrahamson et al.
(2009)
Perceptions of heatwave risks to health: interview-based study of older people in London and
Norwich, UK
London
Norwich (Norfolk)
Interview (n = 73)
Bellamy and Hulme
(2011)*
Beyond the Tipping Point: Understanding Perceptions of Abrupt Climate Change and Their
Implications
East Anglia Mixed Survey (n = 287)
Focus group (n = 15)
Bichard and
Kazmierczak
(2012)*
Are homeowners willing to adapt to and mitigate the effects of climate change? England and Wales Survey (n = 961)
Bradford et al.
(2012)*
Risk perception – issues for ﬂood management in Europe Europe Survey (n = 1375)
Burningham et al.
(2008)
‘It’ll never happen to me’: understanding public awareness of local ﬂood risk England and Wales Mixed Survey (n > 1000)
Focus groups (undisclosed)
Interview (undisclosed)
Butler and Pidgeon
(2011)*
From ‘ﬂood defence’ to ‘ﬂood risk management’: exploring governance, responsibility, and
blame
Shefﬁeld, Oxford, Gloucester Interview
Focus group
Interview (n = 45)
Focus group (n = 50)
Clements (2012)* Exploring public opinion on the issue of climate change in Britain UK Survey Survey 1 (n = 1000)
Survey 2 (n = 2850)
Survey 3 (n = 3393)
Corner et al. (2011)* Nuclear power, climate change and energy security: Exploring British public attitudes UK Survey n = 1822
Costa-Font et al.
(2009)*
Optimism and the perceptions of new risks UK Survey (n = 1547)
Dessai and Sims
(2010)
Public perception of drought and climate change in southeast England South-East England Mixed Survey (n = 102)
Focus group (n = 14)
Few et al. (2007) Public participation and climate change adaptation: Avoiding the illusion of inclusion Christchurch Bay (Dorset), Orkney Interview
Participatory
workshop
Undisclosed
Fielding (2012) Inequalities in exposure and awareness of ﬂood risk in England and Wales England and Wales Survey (n = 1034)
Fischer et al. (2012)* Climate Change? No, Wise Resource Use is the Issue: Social Representations of Energy, Climate
Change and the Future
Europe Interview (n = 202)
Glenk and Fischer
(2010)
Insurance, prevention or just wait and see? Public preferences for water management
strategies in the context of climate change
Scotland Survey (n = 1033)
Harries (2012)* The anticipated emotional consequences of adaptive behaviour-impacts on the take-up of
household ﬂood-protection measures
England Survey (n = 555)
Harries (2008) Feeling secure or being secure? Why it can seem better not to protect yourself against a
natural hazard
UK Focus group
Interview
(n = 40)
Harris and Corner
(2011)*
Communicating Environmental Risks: Clarifying the Severity Effect in Interpretations of Verbal
Probability Expressions. Journal of Experimental Psychology-Learning Memory and Cognition
England and Wales Experiment Experiment 1 (n = 101)
Experiment 2 (n = 83)
Experiment 3 (n = 191)
Harvatt et al. (2011) Understanding householder responses to natural hazards: ﬂooding and sea-level rise
comparisons
Truro (Cornwall) Aldeburg
(Suffolk) Barnstaple (Devon)
Mixed Survey (n = 77)
Interview (n = 35)
Howell (2011)* Lights, camera ... action? Altered attitudes and behaviour in response to the climate change
ﬁlm The Age of Stupid
Edinburgh Survey Survey 1 (n = 213)
Survey 2 (n = 162)
Howgate and Kenyon
(2009)*
Community cooperation with natural ﬂood management: a case study in the Scottish Borders Borthwick (Scottish Borders) Case study
(including
survey)
Survey (n = 30)
Lamond et al. (2009)* Accessibility of ﬂood risk insurance in the UK: confusion, competition and complacency UK Survey (n = 403)
Lorenzoni et al.
(2006)*
Cross-national comparisons of image associations with ‘‘global warming’’ and ‘‘climate
change’’ among laypeople in the United States of America and Great Britain
UK and US Survey UK (n = 316)
US (n = 673)
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Lorenzoni et al.
(2007)*
Barriers perceived to engaging with climate change among the UK public and their policy
implications
UK Mixed Study 1 (see Whitmarsh,
2008)
Study 2 (see O’Neill and
Nicholson-Cole, 2009)
Study 3 Survey (n = 200)
Study 3 Focus group
(undisclosed)
Lorenzoni and
Pidgeon (2006)*
Public views on climate change: European and USA perspectives Europe and US Survey Reanalysis of multiple
surveys
Lowe et al. (2006) Does tomorrow ever come? Disaster narrative and public perceptions of climate change Norwich (Norfolk) Mixed Survey (n = 301)
Focus group (undisclosed)
Morton et al. (2011) The future that may (or may not) come: How framing changes responses to uncertainty in
climate change communications
UK Experiment Study 1 (n = 88)
Study 2 (n = 120)
Niemeyer et al.
(2005)
Rapid climate change and society: Assessing responses and thresholds West Midlands Interview
Q sorting
(n = 29)
O’Neill and
Nicholson-Cole
(2009)
‘‘Fear Won’t Do It’’ Promoting Positive Engagement With Climate Change Through Visual and
Iconic Representations
UK Mixed Interview/Q sort (n = 30)
Focus group (n = 27) Survey
(n = 63)
Palutikof et al. (2004) Public perceptions of unusually warm weather in the UK: impacts, responses and adaptations Scotland, South of England Survey (n = 295)
Parker et al. (2007)* Enhancing the human beneﬁts of ﬂood warnings. Natural Hazards England and Wales Mixed Reanalysis of multiple
surveys and interviews
Parker et al. (2011)* Surface water ﬂood warnings requirements and potential in England and Wales Wealdstone Brook (Greater
London) and Rotherham
(Yorkshire)
Focus groups Public focus groups (n = 31)
Emergency responder focus
groups (n = 33)
Pidgeon et al. (2008)* Climate change or nuclear power – No thanks! UK Survey Reanalysis of multiple
surveys
Poortinga et al.
(2011)
Uncertain climate: An investigation into public scepticism about anthropogenic climate
change
UK Survey (n = 1822)
Rabinovich and
Morton (2012)*
Unquestioned answers or unanswered questions: beliefs about science guide responses to
uncertainty in climate change risk communication
UK and Worldwide Experiment Study 1 (n = 108)
Study 2 (n = 106)
Rundblad et al.
(2010)*
Communication, perception and behaviour during a natural disaster involving a ‘Do Not Drink’
and a subsequent ‘Boil Water’ notice: a postal questionnaire study
Gloucestershire Survey (n = 195)
Soane et al. (2010) Flood perception and mitigation: the role of severity, agency, and experience in the purchase of
ﬂood protection, and the communication of ﬂood information
UK Survey (n = 1732)
Spence and Pidgeon
(2010)
Framing and communicating climate change: The effects of distance and outcome frame
manipulations
UK Experiment (n = 161)
Spence et al. (2012)* The Psychological Distance of Climate Change UK Survey (n = 1822)
Spence et al. (2011)* Perceptions of climate change and willingness to save energy related to ﬂood experience UK Survey (n = 1822)
Whitmarsh (2011)* Scepticism and uncertainty about climate change: Dimensions, determinants and change over
time
Hamshire, Norfolk Survey (n = 1140)
Whitmarsh (2008)* Are ﬂood victims more concerned about climate change than other people? The role of direct
experience in risk perception and behavioural response
South of England Mixed Survey (n = 589)
Interview (n = 24)
Whitmarsh (2009) What’s in a name? Commonalities and differences in public understanding of ‘‘climate change’’
and ‘‘global warming’’
South of England Survey (n = 589)
Wolf et al. (2010a)* Heat waves and cold spells: an analysis of policy response and perceptions of vulnerable
populations in the UK
Norwich (Norfolk) Interview (n = 15)
Wolf et al. (2010b)* Social capital, individual responses to heat waves and climate change adaptation: An empirical
study of two UK cities
London and Norwich (Norfolk) Interview (n = 105)
* Denotes papers extracted from Web of Science (now Web of Science Core Collection) using the search terms outlined in Appendix A.
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6 A.L. Taylor et al. / Climate Risk Management 4–5 (2014) 1–16policies to mitigate or adapt to climate change. However, as Weber and Stern (2011) have noted, it may inadvertently lead
people to believe that the effects of climate change could dissipate as quickly as the effects of other forms of pollution, thus
reducing the perceived need for longer term adaptation measures.
While less widely investigated in a UK context, the conﬂation of the risks posed by climate change impacts with different
(if related) hazards may also be a barrier to adaptation. For instance, an increase in the severity and frequency of summer
heat waves and development of urban hotspots are amongst the projected climate change impacts for the UK (Defra,
2012). While this poses potentially serious health dangers to groups such as the elderly, interviews with British older adults
found that some confused the dangers posed by heat waves with those of UV exposure (Wolf et al., 2010b). Such misunder-
standings may lead to the implementation of inappropriate risk protection efforts, such as applying sunscreen to prevent
sunburn but not drinking enough water to prevent dehydration. The capacity for such misunderstanding to lead to possible
harm has also been highlighted in UK research examining public responses to ‘‘Do Not Drink’’ warnings, issued after ﬂooding
in the Gloucestershire area led to disruption in the supply of clean drinking water. Here it was found that non-compliance
with warnings was linked to an erroneous belief that boiling water would provide sufﬁcient protection against all forms of
contamination (Rundblad et al., 2010). Potential conﬂation may be even more likely with respect to less familiar climate
change impacts. For example, interviews with residents in areas of Southern England at risk from future sea level rise found
that they tended to draw parallels with the more familiar hazards of ﬂooding and coastal erosion (Harvatt et al., 2011).Optimism bias and psychological distance
Of course, in order to take appropriate adaptive measures with respect to present and future hazards, one must recognise
that one is at risk. However, as UK ﬂood risk perception research demonstrates not all those who could be classiﬁed as ‘at
risk’ are aware of the threat to their local area (Burningham et al., 2008; Fielding, 2012). Similarly, people may be aware of
the risk, but not perceive themselves to be personally vulnerable. This may be due to individuals not identifying themselves
as being part of an ‘at risk’ group; as was found when older adults in South East England were interviewed about heat wave
protection (Abrahamson et al., 2009; Wolf et al., 2010a,b). It may also result from optimism bias, or the perception that one’s
probability of experiencing negative events is low (Weinstein, 1987). With respect to the latter, optimism bias has been
found to be associated with greater climate change risk acceptance amongst UK residents (Costa-Font et al., 2009).
Similar to optimism bias, another aspect of non-experts mental models of climate change that has been found to impact
on climate change risk perception is that of psychological distance. In this context psychological distance is deﬁned as the
extent to which the impacts of climate change are perceived as affecting distant geographical areas, occurring further into
the future, and harming other social groups (Locke and Latham, 1990). All three forms of psychological distance have been
associated with lower concern about climate change and greater uncertainty about its existence amongst UK residents
(Spence et al., 2012). While UK participants may generate dramatic and disastrous imagery when thinking of climate change,
they tend to associated it with other areas of the world, thus increasing psychological distance (Lorenzoni et al., 2006). In the
broader literature, the ﬁnding that people tend to consider local environmental problems less serious than those occurring at
a larger geographic scale has been documented in a number of contexts (Uzzell, 2000). Similarly, risks that are expected to
occur in the future are considered to be much less important that risks that are more immediate (Hardisty and Weber, 2009;
Myerson and Green, 1995). However, direct experience with risks may make them seem more concrete and less psycholog-
ically distant (Trope and Liberman, 2010). Research comparing the climate change beliefs of those in the UK and Australia
suggests that this may be the case; with UK residents demonstrating greater psychological distance than those in Australia,
who have had greater exposure to severe climate impacts (Reser et al., 2012).
In addition to potentially reducing concern about climate change and willingness to engage in mitigation activities, opti-
mism bias and psychological distance may also affect willingness to engage in proactive adaptation to future climate change
impacts. Indeed, in case studies examining two UK coastal communities at risk from sea level rise it was found that while
residents agreed that ‘something should be done,’ they were unwilling to act due to uncertainty about how imminent the
threat would be (Few et al., 2007). However, further research is needed to examine under which conditions psychological
distancing might act as a barrier to adaptation, and whether it varies with nature and familiarity of the impact in question.Climate change beliefs and adaptation
Longitudinal analysis of public opinion polls indicate that consensus amongst experts as to the existence of anthropogenic
climate change is overwhelmingly high (Doran and Zimmerman, 2009). By comparison, belief in the existence of manmade
climate change amongst non-experts in the UK and elsewhere is prone to greater vacillation (Ratter et al., 2012). Yet, few UK
studies have examined the relationship between climate change awareness and willingness to implement adaptation. A
recent survey conducted in England and Wales found a signiﬁcant correlation between climate change awareness and stated
willingness to adopt domestic level ﬂood protection (Bichard and Kazmierczak, 2012). However, no relationship between
climate change awareness and willingness to engage in water saving behaviours was found amongst participants in UK areas
at risk of drought (Dessai and Sims, 2010).
Findings from other developed countries also show a somewhat mixed picture. A survey with householders in Dresden
found only a weak association between climate change awareness and willingness to undertake action in response to the
A.L. Taylor et al. / Climate Risk Management 4–5 (2014) 1–16 7threat of ﬂooding, with household size, prior ﬂood experience, and home ownership having stronger associations with ﬂood
protection uptake (Kreibich, 2011). Interviews and surveys with landholders in South West Australia found little difference
between climate change believers and sceptics with respect to their tendency to focus on short-term rather than long-term
actions in responding to the threat posed by hotter, drier conditions (Mazur et al., 2013). In line with these ﬁndings, two
other Australian studies showed that support for proactive adaptation initiatives may be lower amongst climate sceptics
(Alexander et al., 2012; Buys et al., 2012). In the latter case, individuals who did not believe that sea level rise is occurring
tended to be strongly opposed to preventive retreat from coastal areas.
A recent US survey reported support for preventative adaptive action to limit the damage caused by future storms and sea
level rise (StanfordWoods Institute for the Environment, 2013). Interestingly, 60% of respondents who doubted the existence
of climate change still supported some form of adaptation, perhaps because of the salience of Hurricane Sandy (Stanford
Woods Institute for the Environment, 2013). It is therefore possible that where projected climate change impacts are more
familiar, more immediate and more salient, climate change beliefs have low impact on willingness to proactively adopt pro-
tection measures and support adaptation policy. In a UK context, this may mean that willingness to support proactive adap-
tation measures against increased ﬂood risk may be strong independent of climate change beliefs, while climate change
beliefs do play a role in willingness to protect against less familiar impacts. However, more UK focussed research is needed
to ascertain whether this is indeed the case.Experience, risk perception and action
As discussed in ‘Non-experts’ mental models of climate change, climate impacts and climate’ and ‘Climate change beliefs
and adaptation’, research suggests that familiarity with extreme weather events can reduce psychological distancing (Reser
et al., 2012), and increase support for adaptation policy (Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment, 2013). It also
suggests that people draw on intuitive associations and analogy with familiar hazards in forming mental models of those
that are less familiar (Fischer et al., 2012; Visschers et al., 2007; Wallquist et al., 2010). However, when considering the rela-
tionship between direct personal experience of hazards and the perceived threat posed by them, a mixed pattern of results
emerges.
Work in the broader risk perception literature suggests that whenmaking judgments and choices from experience, people
can overestimate the likelihood of hazards that have recently been experienced (Hertwig et al., 2004), especially when these
events are rare but extreme in nature (Keller et al., 2006). Paradoxically however, where they have not been recently expe-
rienced, the likelihood of severe but rare hazards may also be underestimated as a result of their infrequency (Hertwig and
Erev, 2009). This can be explained by what is known as the availability heuristic, whereby experiencing a highly negative
event increases its availability from memory, which in turn increases the perceived likelihood of its re-occurrence
(Kahneman et al., 1982). However, in cases where people have been exposed to a hazard without experiencing expected neg-
ative outcomes, they may subsequently perceive it to be less risky (Halpern-Felsher et al., 2001). Hence, familiar hazards may
evoke less fear than those that are less familiar if they have not led to personal experiences with negative outcomes (Slovic,
1987).
As previously noted, in the UK it is anticipated that climate change will increase the frequency and severity of relatively
familiar extreme weather events such as ﬂooding, heat waves and drought. It is therefore important to understand how this
prior experience can affect both risk perception and the adoption of climate change adaptation.Experience and adaptation to climate change impacts
The UK is likely to experience more ﬂooding as a result of climate change in the future (Defra, 2012). Previous work indi-
cates a strong association between ﬂood experience and ﬂood risk awareness (Burningham et al., 2008). A survey across 13
European locations including Scotland found that ﬂood experience was associated with both ﬂood awareness and ﬂood pre-
paredness, but not with climate change awareness (Bradford et al., 2012). However, responses to open ended questions also
suggested that risk perception amongst those who had previously experienced ﬂooding can diminish as a consequence of
new ﬂood defences being erected (Bradford et al., 2012). Other UK studies have found that individuals who had ﬂood expe-
rience were more likely to have taken steps to install home ﬂood protection – though uptake of most measures was still rel-
atively low (Harries, 2012; Lamond et al., 2009). Another investigation observed that UK participants who reported direct
ﬂood experience and perceived more risk severity were more likely to have adopted some form of protection (Soane
et al., 2010). However, as discussed in the following section on ‘Emotions’, there are also situations in which ﬂood experience
may actually reduce the uptake of ﬂood protection by increasing anxiety and avoidant behaviour (Harries, 2012).
Relatively few UK studies have examined the extent to which prior experience with weather-related events other than
ﬂooding inﬂuences uptake of protective measures. One UK survey did ﬁnd that respondents who recalled discomfort during
a heat wave tended to perceive more negative impacts of that heat wave on health service provision, agriculture, and work
productivity (Palutikof et al., 2004). It would thus seem possible that past experience of discomfort may also inﬂuence per-
ception of future events and willingness to adopt adaptive measures. Another study found that people in Southern and
Anglian regions of England enacted water saving measures in response to water-shortages during a regional drought,
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translate into long-term behavioural change.Experience of extreme weather and beliefs about climate change
Studies conducted in the UK and elsewhere have shown that perceived (Li et al., 2011; Taylor et al., 2014) and experi-
enced (Deryugina, 2013; Egan and Mullin, 2012) changes in local weather are associated with stronger climate change
beliefs. However, the extent to which the experience of particular extreme weather events impact on belief in the existence
of climate change, and concern about its impacts, is less well-known.
With respect to ﬂooding, one UK study found that individuals with personal ﬂood experience were no more likely than
others to believe in anthropogenic climate change, perceive climate change as personally threatening, or implement mitiga-
tion behaviours (Whitmarsh, 2008). However, a more recent UK survey did ﬁnd a positive association between reported
ﬂood experience and willingness to reduce energy consumption, which may have been due to increased climate change con-
cern, perceived self-efﬁcacy, and perceived climate change risk to local area (Spence et al., 2011). This disparity in ﬁndings
could be explained in a number of ways. The authors of the latter study note that recent ﬂooding in the UK, along with recent
public discourse about climate change, may have rendered the link between climate change and ﬂooding more salient
amongst those with ﬂood experience (Spence et al., 2011). Differences in sampling and the deﬁnition of ‘ﬂood experience’
may also have contributed to the difference in ﬁndings between the two studies: The former surveyed respondents from
a speciﬁc region of England (Hampshire) and deﬁned ‘ﬂood experience’ as having property damaged by ﬂooding
(Whitmarsh, 2008). The second survey utilised a representative nationwide sample and deﬁned ‘ﬂood experience’ as encoun-
tering ﬂooding in one’s local area (Spence et al., 2011).
In work outside the UK it has been posited that experience of extreme weather and natural disasters increases concern
about climate change and willingness to engage in mitigation activities – but only if the experienced event itself is attributed
to climate change (Reser et al., 2014; Reser et al., 2012). The ﬁndings of one longitudinal US study have also suggested that
experience of extreme weather events may increase climate change concern amongst those without strong pre-existing cli-
mate change beliefs, but that those possessing strong belief or strong disbelief in the existence of climate change may engage
in motivated reasoning and interpret events in a manner that supports existing beliefs (Myers et al., 2013). While climate
change is a politically polarising issue in the UK (Spence et al., 2011; Whitmarsh, 2009), there is greater agreement that cli-
mate change in caused by human activity amongst the general population in the UK (64%) than in the US (54%) (Ipsos MORI,
2014). Hence, one might expect to ﬁnd a stronger association between experience of extreme weather events and climate
change concern amongst UK residents. However, based on the evidence currently available, ﬁrm conclusions cannot be
drawn. Longitudinal research would be needed to establish the extent to which directly experiencing extreme events
inﬂuences climate change beliefs and concern.
Based on the research discussed above it appears that the extent to which prior experience of extreme weather and asso-
ciated hazards impact on both preparedness to adapt, and beliefs about climate change, warrants further exploration. With
regard to adaptation in particular, it would seem that the relationship between prior experience and willingness to engage in
proactive adaptation may depend on the nature of the hazard. However, as the available literature has primarily focussed on
ﬂooding, more research is needed regarding the extent to which prior experience of heat waves, water restrictions during
droughts, and other anticipated climate change impacts. Another question that may be asked is whether preparedness to
adopt and support protective measures in response to one type of extreme weather event generalises to other anticipated
climate change impacts; and, if so, whether this is contingent on concern about climate change.Emotions
As noted in the ‘Introduction’, emotions have long been recognised as playing a key role in public risk perception. Hazards
that evoke negative emotions tend to be perceived as more risky and requiring mitigation (Slovic, 1987). However, intense
negative emotions can have a counterproductive effect on risk protection behaviour, with fear and anxiety leading to avoid-
ant behaviours and defensive denial (Witte and Allen, 2000).
In the UK, research examining the efﬁcacy of using anxiety-provoking communications and scenarios to increase climate
change awareness has produced mixed results. Viewing the climate change disaster ﬁlm The Day After Tomorrow has been
associated with both greater anxiety regarding climate change and a desire to ‘‘do more’’ to mitigate climate change, but also
with greater psychological distancing, perhaps as a strategy for anxiety avoidance (Lowe et al., 2006). This is echoed by ﬁnd-
ings gathered from focus-groups, suggesting that while alarmist imagery may succeed in inducing climate change concern, it
may also reduce perceptions about being able to do ‘‘something about climate change’’ and increase psychological distanc-
ing, denial and apathy (O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole, 2009). A later study did ﬁnd that those viewing climate change disaster
movie The Age of Stupid reported a subsequent increase in mitigation behaviours (Howell, 2011). However, participants in
this study already showed high levels of climate concern prior to viewing the movie (Howell, 2011). Hence, the impact of
anxiety-provoking communication on action may be moderated by existing concerns about climate change.
Individual responses to severe hypothetical climate change scenarios may also depend on how much anxiety is evoked.
For instance when being presented with extreme climate change scenarios, focus-group participants expressed helplessness
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responses (Niemeyer et al., 2005). One experimental study did ﬁnd stronger levels of fear to be associated with better infor-
mation recall, which was in turn associated with a more positive attitude towards climate mitigation (Spence and Pidgeon,
2010). However, in this latter investigation the communications presented to participants were not alarmist in nature, and
mitigation was presented as a feasible risk reduction measure. This is in keeping with ﬁndings from the broader risk com-
munication literature, which suggests that fear-appeals tend to be effective only when they trigger moderate (rather than
high) fear, and provide recipients with easy to implements strategies to reduce risk (Witte and Allen, 2000).
With respect to adaptation to climate change impacts, the available evidence also suggests that greater anxiety may not
always lead to greater uptake of protective measures. Recent research has suggested that UK ﬂood victims who have high
anxiety about ﬂooding may avoid protective behaviour because they don’t want to be reminded about their negative expe-
rience with ﬂooding (Harries, 2012). These ﬁndings were consistent with previous work (Harries, 2008), which found that a
desire to preserve feelings of security in the home may, in certain cases, act as a barrier to the adoption of protective mea-
sures. Indeed, in a survey conducted with a pan-European sample, greater self-reported worry about ﬂooding was not found
to correspond with better ﬂood preparedness (Bradford et al., 2012). It has also been suggested that the low response to ﬂood
warnings observed amongst the UK public may be partly attributable to stress induced passivity (Parker et al., 2007). Again,
this suggests that using anxiety-provoking communications to highlight domestic ﬂood risk may not always be effective in
encouraging the uptake of protective behaviours.
Of course, while ﬂooding is associated with negative emotions, the same cannot necessarily be said for all climate change
impacts. Owing to the UK’s temperate climate, and the relative infrequency of hot weather, the prospect of more hot sum-
mers and warmer winters may evoke positive emotions amongst those living in the UK. Existing research does indeed sug-
gest that this is the case, especially amongst those in cooler regions of the UK (Palutikof et al., 2004). As people tend to
perceive things they feel positively towards as less risky (Slovic et al., 2004), this may reduce recognition of the need for pro-
tective action in the event of heat waves. More research is however needed to ascertain how UK residents currently perceive
the risks posed by heat waves, and whether this impacts on protective behaviours and support for risk reduction policy.Responsibility and agency
In exploring the factors inﬂuencing public willingness to support climate change adaptation policy, and adopt protective
measures at an individual level, it would seem reasonable to question what the roles of responsibility and agency might be.
Research focussing on barriers to climate change mitigation amongst members of the UK public found that participants often
expressed powerlessness (e.g. the sentiment that individual actions made little difference) and lower responsibility for car-
bon emissions than other actors (e.g. the government, larger countries such as the US); a ﬁnding that posited to result from
motivated reasoning to justify a lack of motivation to act, or avoid anxiety (Lorenzoni et al., 2007). However, this does not
address whether these factors will be a barrier to adaptation, which is focusses on impacts rather than causes.
To date, evidence suggests that people in the UK do tend to perceive central and local government as responsible for imple-
menting climate change adaptation. Survey studies show that ﬂood riskmanagement is seen as a task for the government and
regulators, with some responsibility being attributed to home owners for protecting their own property (Bichard and
Kazmierczak, 2012; Soane et al., 2010). Interviewswith residents of three UK cities affected by ﬂooding also showed that local
authorities were held responsible, with residents’ personal power to manage ﬂoods being perceived as low (Butler and
Pidgeon, 2011).
Yet, the relationship between perceived responsibility and the uptake of domestic ﬂood protection measures remains
unclear. One investigation found that uptake of ﬂood protection was higher amongst respondents who judged responsibility
of regulators to be low (Soaneet al., 2010). Another found that attributionof responsibilitywasnot signiﬁcantly associatedwith
willingness to adopt ﬂood protection (Bichard and Kazmierczak, 2012). Amongst residents of Southern and Anglian regions of
England surveyed regarding drought and water restrictions, a majority stated that responsibility for water management lay
with private companies or government (Dessai and Sims, 2010). However, a Scottish case study examining local residents’will-
ingness to accept the development of ﬂood defences for the beneﬁt of other communities showed that peoplemay bewilling to
support protective action if they perceive responsibilities towards the intended beneﬁciaries (Howgate and Kenyon, 2009).
Hence, the extent to which attributions of responsibility are associated with willingness to support adaptation and undertake
protective behaviours is unclear. Additionally, asmuch of the available research focusses on the familiar hazard of ﬂooding, the
question of how perceived responsibility might affect response to less familiar climate change impacts is yet to be addressed.
As noted above, interviews with members of the public in an area with high ﬂood risk suggested that participants com-
monly perceived themselves to be ‘‘powerless’’ with respect to ﬂood risk management (Butler and Pidgeon, 2011). This
theme of ‘‘powerlessness’’ was also echoed in interviews with people in areas at risk from water shortages (Dessai and
Sims, 2010). Within the risk literature, such lack of agency has been linked with being less likely to take protective action.
Indeed, perceived behavioural control is among the key elements of behaviour change theories (e.g. Ajzen and Madden,
1986; Bandura, 1977; Maddux and Rogers, 1983).
In thedomainof climate change, agencyhasbeen linked towillingness to engage in bothmitigationandadaptation amongst
UK residents. For instance, the perception that ‘‘I can personally help to reduce climate change by changingmy behaviour’’ was
found to be a signiﬁcant predictor of willingness to undertake energy savingmeasures (Spence et al., 2011). In an examination
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Another recent study however did not ﬁnd that link (Harries, 2012), perhaps due to self-efﬁcacy predicting the adoption of
short-term reactive measures rather than long-term protective actions (see also (Zaalberg et al., 2009)).
Of course, as has been noted with respect to mitigation (Lorenzoni et al., 2007), a reported lack of agency may not always
reﬂect a straightforward appraisal of one’s capacity to act. In situations where the decision to act or not act may be construed
as having a moral component (e.g. reducing energy use to mitigate against climate change, engaging in water saving behav-
iour during a water shortage), failure to undertake moral actions may lead to displacement of responsibility or minimisation
of agency (Bandura et al., 1996).Place attachment
It has been argued that factors such as culture, identity, attachment to place, values and regional risk attitudes will deter-
mine both the perceived need to adapt and the acceptability of particular adaptive measures (Adger et al., 2009). Some
authors note the importance of examining how lay people’s perceptions of climate change are related to their relationship
with the landscape (Brace and Geoghegan, 2011; Geoghegan and Leyson, 2012), and the need to consider attachment to place
in relation to climate change adaptation (Devine-Wright, 2013). However, we found no UK studies examining the role of place
attachment in support for climate change adaptation. Recent work focussing on acceptance of renewable energy develop-
ments in Northern Ireland has however suggested that acceptance of developments depends on the extent towhich the devel-
opments are perceived to ﬁt the symbolic meaning of the speciﬁc place; for instance, with support for novel developments
when place attachment is less characterised as being ‘anti-change’ (Devine-Wright, 2011). Similar issuesmay arise in the con-
text of climate change adaptation developments. Further research is however needed to ascertain whether this is the case.Personal values and individual differences
In the literature on public perceptions of climate change a number of studies have focussed on the role of individual dif-
ferences such as pro-environmental values, cultural worldview, and political afﬁliation, in shaping beliefs and concern about
climate change. However, fewer studies have examined how these factors affect attitudes towards speciﬁc climate change
impacts and adaptation.
Drawing on work conducted in the ﬁeld of anthropology, four fundamental ‘‘cultural worldviews’’ have been identiﬁed as
relevant to risk perception (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983): Hierarchists value social and institutional hierarchies and view
nature as manageable if appropriate regulations are enforced; Egalitarians, while concerned about group welfare, reject insti-
tutionally imposed regulation and view nature as fragile and easily disrupted; Individualists emphasise personal freedom and
personal responsibility, and view nature as benign; Fatalists tend to view outcomes as the product of chance and nature as
fundamentally outside human control. It has been proposed that these four cultural worldviews map onto perceptions of cli-
mate change and its solutions (Thompson and Rayner, 1998); with Hierarchists favouring expert-driven regulatory
approaches to mitigation, Egalitarians favouring voluntary approaches, Individualists favouring market-based approaches,
and Fatalists being disengaged from the matter. In one survey, it was found that, consistent with the views on nature detailed
above, egalitarians expressedmore concern about climate change than individualists and fatalists (Bellamy and Hulme, 2011).
However, in a follow-up focus group, cultural views failed to align with policy preferences, and statements of fatalism were
common across participants (Bellamy and Hulme, 2011). Hence, evidence regarding the efﬁcacy of operationalizing cultural
theory as a quantitative ‘individual difference’ measure appears to be mixed.
However, the cultural theory approach described above has been criticised for failing to capture attitudes towards differ-
ent types of risk (Sjoberg, 2000). Indeed, UK research shows that pro-environmental values speciﬁcally are associated with
belief in the existence of anthropogenic climate change (Poortinga et al., 2011; Whitmarsh, 2008, 2011), as well as with
greater climate change concern, perceived personal threat from climate change, and willingness to engage in mitigation
actions (Whitmarsh, 2008). This is similar to ﬁndings obtained in other developed countries (Brody et al., 2008; Kellstedt
et al., 2008). Also in keeping with ﬁndings obtained in other developed countries (McCright and Dunlap, 2011, 2013;
Reser et al., 2012; Zia and Todd, 2010), research in the UK has demonstrated a consistent association between right-of-centre
political afﬁliation and greater climate change scepticism (Clements, 2012; Poortinga et al., 2011; Whitmarsh, 2008, 2011);
although as previously noted climate scepticism does not appear to be as strong in the UK as the US (Ipsos MORI, 2014;
Lorenzoni and Pidgeon, 2006).
Of course, while pro-environmental values and political afﬁliation are associated with beliefs about the nature and causes
of climate change (Poortinga et al., 2011; Whitmarsh, 2008, 2011), their relationship with support for adaptation policy is far
less well understood. As noted in the earlier section on ‘Climate change beliefs and adaptation’, belief in the existence of
anthropogenic climate change may not necessarily be a prerequisite for supporting adaptation to the anticipated impacts
of climate change (Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment, 2013). Conversely, being concerned about climate change
and having strong pro-environmental values does not necessarily mean that one will support all adaptation measures. In the
context of mitigation, for instance, it has been demonstrated that climate change concern does not necessarily lead to greater
support for nuclear power amongst UK residents (Corner et al., 2011; Pidgeon et al., 2008). Hence, more research is needed to
identify the extent to which individual differences affect the types of adaptation UK residents are willing to support and
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values and support for climate change adaptation measures. This study investigated the extent to which support for two
ﬂood adaptation measures (soft engineering and public insurance) could be predicted by general versus more context spe-
ciﬁc personal values (Glenk and Fischer, 2010). It was found that while the context-speciﬁc ‘‘governance related’’ values of
sustainability and solidarity predicted support for the soft-engineering and public insurance measures respectively; sustain-
ability and solidarity were themselves associated with greater concern for the wider world (Glenk and Fischer, 2010), as
measured by the construct of ‘‘self-transcendent’’ (Schwartz, 1992, 1994). These ﬁndings are interesting as they suggest that
both context-speciﬁc and general values can inﬂuence support for adaptation policy. However, as this is as yet an isolated
study, the extent to which these ﬁndings might generalise is yet to be determined. Again, more research is needed to identify
how individual differences impact on support for climate change adaptation in different contexts.Uncertainty
While there is little disagreement amongst climate scientists as to the existence of anthropogenic climate change (Doran
and Zimmerman, 2009), far greater uncertainty exists as to what its precise impacts will be on human and natural systems at
regional and local levels (Dessai et al., 2007; Field et al., 2014). The question of how the public perceives and responds to this
uncertainty is therefore a matter of some concern in the ﬁeld of climate risk management; as is the question of how uncer-
tainty in climate and climate impact projections can best be communicated to the public (Dessai and Hulme, 2004; Pidgeon
and Fischhoff, 2011; Spence et al., 2012).
A 2007 poll conducted in the UK indicated that 40% of the UK population agreed that ‘‘the climate system is too complex
and uncertain for scientists to make useful forecasts’’ (Downing and Ballantyne, 2007). It has also been found that uncer-
tainty regarding how serious the impacts of climate of climate change will be correlates with greater scepticism regarding
the existence of climate change and its anthropogenic nature (Spence et al., 2011). When combined with the fact that greater
uncertainty regarding the existence and severity of anthropogenic climate change is associated with greater psychological
distancing (Spence et al., 2012), this raises the question as the extent to which uncertainty about the severity and nature
of climate change impacts could act as a barrier to adaptation. In the study of psychological distance cited above, climate
change uncertainty was not found to be an independent predictor of willingness to undertake mitigation actions (Spence
et al., 2012). However, as discussed in the section on ‘Non-experts’ mental models of climate change, climate impacts and
climate’, case studies conducted with two British communities at risk from sea level rise suggest that uncertainty about
future climate, compounded by temporal distance, can be a barrier to proactive adaptation (Few et al., 2007). Again, the
extent to which a particular type of impact has already been experienced may affect the extent to which uncertainty over
its future frequency and severity reduces willingness to act. Prior exposure to ‘‘false alarms’’ may also reduce willingness
to act; an issue raised in UK ﬂood warning focus groups (Parker et al., 2011).
It is also worth noting that not all ﬁndings indicate that uncertainty is an unequivocal barrier to action. The results of a
recent series of UK investigations suggests that when uncertainty exists in communications about climate change, pro-
environmental behavioural intentions are facilitated by (a) framing information in a manner that elicits caution (Morton
et al., 2011) and (b) a belief that the goal of science is debate rather than absolute truth (Rabinovich and Morton, 2012).
Whether attitude towards scientiﬁc uncertainty and precautionary message framing might impact on willingness to support
adaptation policies and actively adopt protection against climate change impacts is however not yet clear.
One problem faced by those seeking to communicate the uncertainties associated with climate change and its impacts
with the public, is that this informationmay not be readily understood by recipients, or interpreted as communicators intend.
Ability to appropriately understand and utilise risk information can be strongly inﬂuenced by factors such as numeracy
(Peters et al., 2006; Reyna et al., 2009) and graph literacy (Galesic and Garcia-Retamero, 2011). In a climate risk management
context, this means not only that general communications about the phenomenon of climate change may be misunderstood,
but that warnings about the immediate level of threat posed by speciﬁc impacts may not be understood and appropriately
acted upon. Indeed, UK focus-groups conducted to examine perceptions of surface ﬂood warnings, found that both members
of the public and professional emergency respondents often failed to accurately interpret information about ﬂood probabil-
ities (Parker et al., 2011). Using verbal rather than numerical descriptions (e.g. terms such as ‘‘likely’’ or ‘‘unlikely’’) may be one
way of communicating uncertainty about future climate change impacts to non-technical individuals. However, while this
strategy has been used in IPCC assessment reports (Mastrandrea et al., 2010), research conducted with members of the public
in the UK and elsewhere suggests that the interpretation of such terminology may lead inconsistent perceptions of risk
(Budescu et al., 2009; Harris and Corner, 2011). A number of resources make recommendations as to how information about
risk and uncertainty can be most effectively presented (see for example Lipkus, 2007; Spiegelhalter et al., 2011). Although a
full discussion of these is beyond the scope of the present review, we echo the point made by Spiegelhalter et al. (2011) that it
is important to fully test how communications regarding risk will be interpreted before disseminating them.Synthesis and future directions
The preceding review discusses what is known about public perceptions of climate change risk and adaptation in a UK
context. We ﬁnd that, as is the case in other parts of the world, UK residents’ mental models of climate change often diverge
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Lorenzoni et al., 2006; Whitmarsh, 2009). However, when it comes to perceptions of climate change impacts, the available
evidence suggests that those in the UKmore readily associate climate change with different events (e.g. ﬂooding and rainfall)
than countries with warmer climates (Lorenzoni et al., 2006; Whitmarsh, 2009). Indeed, highlighting the possibility of an
increase in warmer weather may elicit positive as well as negative responses amongst the British public (Palutikof et al.,
2004). This underscores the importance of taking a country-speciﬁc approach to examining the link between perceptions
of local weather and beliefs about climate change. It may also suggest that emphasising climate impacts relating to these
locally salient wet-weather events could reduce psychological distancing and increase concern about climate change and
its impacts. However, this possibility requires further investigation. Indeed, even if it proves to be effective, it could bring
with it the unintended consequence of minimising the risk posed by increases in other climate risks such as heat waves.
With respect to willingness to undertake protective measures at an individual level, the available UK evidence suggests
that prior experience of ﬂooding does not consistently correspond with increased uptake of adaptive measures (Harries,
2012; Lamond et al., 2009). Whether this is the case for other anticipated climate change impacts, such as heat waves
and water-shortages, however remains a largely open question. Once again, it may be the case that the positive association
many members of the British public have with warmer weather, attenuates concern regarding the threats posed by an
increase in hot, dry weather. Evidence gathered in the UK and elsewhere also suggests that, where climate change impacts
represent an intensiﬁcation of familiar forms of extreme weather, belief in climate change may not always be a prerequisite
for supporting adaptation policy and taking protective action (Dessai and Sims, 2010; Stanford Woods Institute for the
Environment, 2013). However, where anticipated climate change impacts represent ‘‘new’’ and psychologically distant haz-
ards occurring in the future, climate change beliefs may be a stronger driver of support for adaptation policy and willingness
to adopt protective measures (Buys et al., 2012; Alexander et al., 2012); which may further be compounded by uncertainty as
to the magnitude of impacts (Few et al., 2007; Spence et al., 2012). Again, more research is needed to ascertain the extent to
which climate change beliefs predict support for adaptation when it comes to familiar and unfamiliar impacts. Likewise,
there is scope for further exploration of the extent to which attribution of responsibility and perceived personal agency affect
both support for adaptation policy at a governmental level, and uptake of individual protection.
The question of how political afﬁliation and other personal values might impact on acceptance of adaptation policy also
warrants further investigation. As discussed in ‘Uncertainty’, a clear correspondence between centre-right political afﬁliation
and greater climate scepticism has been found in the UK (Poortinga et al., 2011; Whitmarsh, 2011) and other developed
countries (McCright and Dunlap, 2011, 2013; Reser et al., 2012; Zia and Todd, 2010). However, the relationship between
political afﬁliation and attitude towards adaptation measures and policy is far less clear. The little UK research that has
examined the relationship between values related to governance and support for adaptation policy suggests that different
governance-related values may predict support for different types of policy (Glenk and Fischer, 2010). As these ﬁndings come
from a single study however, its generalizability may be limited.
From a climate change risk communication perspective, the UK research reviewed here has yielded ﬁndings that are
generally consistent with those reported in the wider risk communication literature. Where fear-provoking climate change
scenarios are presented without clear steps for mitigation and risk reduction, fatalism, helplessness and psychological dis-
tancing can be elicited (Bellamy and Hulme, 2011; Lowe et al., 2006). Likewise, work with ﬂood victims suggests that anxiety
and worry do not necessarily predict greater uptake of protective behaviours (Bradford et al., 2012; Harries, 2012). Indeed
anxiety may elicit avoidant thinking and behaviours (Harries, 2012). This mirrors existing research conducted in the health
promotion ﬁeld, which suggests that fear-appeals are only effective if they induce only a moderate amount of fear, and pro-
vide recipients with risk reduction steps that can be readily implemented (Witte and Allen, 2000). As previously noted
though, the predominance of ﬂood-related research in the UK adaptation literature means that behavioural and psycholog-
ical responses to other anticipated climate change impacts, especially those that represent ‘‘new’’ and unfamiliar hazards, is
much less well understood.
As stated at the outset, this review was undertaken with the goal of ascertaining what is currently known about public
perceptions of climate change risk and climate change adaptation amongst the UK public. We found relatively few studies
about public perceptions of climate change adaptation. However, those focusing on public perceptions of climate change
risks reveal several similarities between the climate change beliefs of those in the UK and other developed countries. There
are however also key differences; with some of the most striking being related to the types of climate change impact most
salient to UK residents versus those in countries with warmer and less temperate climates. This highlights the importance of
taking a country-speciﬁc approach to examining and addressing public perceptions of the risks posed by climate change, as
well as to promoting climate change adaptation.Acknowledgements
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